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ABSTRACT 
Written in the spirit of cognitive semantics, the paper is an attempt at analysing the limited 
understanding by Christian believers of the Trinitarian dogma as presented in biblical and 
theological texts. Though ultimately an insoluble mystery for human reason, the dogma can be 
shown to have ameasure of metaphorical and metonymic coherence. At the same time, the paper 
claims that human access to transcendental notions is, in a deep sense, inevitably metaphorical, 
and consists of an elaborate network of mappings of human-sized notions onto the domain of 
the divine. This network is claimed to be amanifestation ofthe root metaphor GOD-HUMAN. The 
author further claims that the opposite root metaphor, HUMAN-GOD, constitutes one of the 
warrants, together with divine inspiration and the context provided by Revelation, of the truth 
of statements about God made on the basis of the first root metaphor. 
KEYWORDS: cognitive semantics, religious discourse, mapping, metaphor, metonymy, 
theology, truth, trinitarian dogma, root metaphor, metaphorico-metonymic coherence. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The mystery of the Holy Trinity is a belief upon which the faith of al1 Christians rests, as St 
Caesarius of Arles declared in one of his sermons (see Catechism of the Catholic Church, 
henceforth C.C., p. 55). Al1 Christians are "baptised in the name of the Father, and of the Son, 
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and of the Holy Spirit; not in their names, for there is only one God [. . .]: the most Holy Trinity" 
(ibid.). This is "the central mystery of Christian faith and life [...] the mystery of God in himself. 
It is therefore the source of al1 other mysteries of faith, the light that enlightens them" (ibid., p. 
56). "God has left some traces of his Trinitarian being" in his 'oikonomia', that is his works, but 
"his inmost Being as Holy Trinity is a mystery that is inaccessible to reason alone" (ibid.). 
These words provide sufficient reasons to make a study of our limited understanding of 
this mystery an extremely interesting task. The first reason is its very centrality to our faith. The 
second reason is its transcendental nature, which simply baffles human logic: how can three be 
one and one three? But the fact that it is above human logic does not mean that there is no 
coherence at al1 in it. In fact, there is a mysterious interna1 coherence in this belief, a weak 
glimpse of which we get through the language of the biblical passages which contain God's 
revelation of the mystery to the sacred writers. This coherence may only be glimpsed, as if from 
an immense distance, thanks to the metaphorical and metonymic abilities of human beings. The 
Bible uses some basic metaphors and metonymies to talk about God, exploiting some of them 
in unheard of ways. Christian theological reflection on most doctrinal issues has since the earliest 
times worked to a very large extent within the conceptual networks established by these 
metaphors and metonymies, and has exploited them in new ways or used other metaphors and 
metonymies from the stock offered by the culture and language of the theological writer'. The 
trinitarian dogma, as fixed by the first ecumenical council at Nicaea and by the second 
ecumenical council at Constantinople, reiterates these metaphors and metonymies. 
This is hardly surprising, in view of the highly figurative character of religious language 
in general. Religious language has to be figurative because it deals with conceptual domains and 
entities which are not conceptually and linguistically apprehensible in an immediate, direct way. 
Therefore, when discussing religious experiences or religious concepts, the person of faith, or 
the theologian, has to use metaphor and metonymy, which are cognitive models that help humans 
to conceptualise experiences which are not what Lakoff and Johnson (1 980) temed 'emergent 
concepts', i.e. nonmetaphorical gestalt concepts emerging from direct experiences, such as 
'object', 'up', 'down', 'person', 'container', 'here', etc. After all, this situation does not apply 
only to religious language, but to other special types of language, like scientific language; and, 
given our cognitive makeup, the use of metaphors and metonymies is advantageous to theology, 
science, and any other explanatory enterprises (Mac Cormac, 1976). In fact, the use of metaphor 
and metonymy is pervasive in al1 sorts of language, including ordinary language (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980)'. 
In this essay 1 will study the metaphorico-metonymic network that underlies the 
formulation of the Trinitarian dogma and the language of some of the biblical passages that led 
to it. 1 will begin with the description of some of the main metaphors and metonymies that are 
used in the formulation of the dogma and in the preceding scriptural passages. Instead of 
analysing just the formulation of the dogma as crystallised in the Niceno-Constantinopolitan 
Creed, 1 will also study the basically metaphorico-metonymic structure of the theological 
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discussion and elucidation of the dogma. Since the fact of anaiysing al1 or even just a 
representative subset of the main theological contributions to this discussion throughout histoy 
would go far beyond the bounds of this essay, 1 have chosen the relevant sections of the recent 
Catechism of the Catholic Church (1994), as an authoritative compendium of the dogmatic 
teachings of the Catholic ~hurch ' .  Then 1 will attempt to identifj the fundamental metaphors and 
metonymies whose interaction constitutes the dogma, and will simply suggest how it could be 
made somewhat coherent at the figurative level, even if still not intelligible from a logical- 
referential standpoint. However, the suggestions given in part 3 should only be taken as the way 
in which one could analogically imagine, but by no means explain, how God can be one and 
three. Finally 1 will discuss the implications of the coherence of these metaphors for the 
problems of tmth and the understanding of religious language in general. 
The description and analysis of metaphor and metonymy in this essay has been done in 
the spirit of cognitive semantics. The reader is assumed to be familiar with the basic tenets of 
the cognitive theory of metaphor and metonymy, as developed over the past two decades by 
writers like Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Johnson (1 987), Lakoff (1 987,1990, 1993), Lakoff and 
Tumer (1989), Tumer (1987, 1991), as well as by Kovecses (e.g. 1990), Gibbs (1 994), and many 
others. 
This essay is then a semantic study, not a theological essay. But since 1 am a Roman 
Catholic it should be clear that 1 will ultimately be writing from my faith. 1 am not an aloof 
externa1 observer of the dogma. 1 am an active believer in it. This means that 1 have written this 
study not only as amodest contribution to cognitive semantics but even more as amanifestation 
of faith. 1 follow here St Augustine's admonition, expressed at the beginning of De Trinitate, to 
mistmst those Christians that, when writing about God "consider it beneath their dignity to begin 
with faith, and who are led into error by their immature and perverted love of reason" (quoted 
in Muller 1990: XIV).  
11. METAPHORS AND METONYMIES IN THE TRINITARIAN DOGMA 
In my view there are two basic 'root metaphors', to use Mac Cormac's term, in the scriptural 
revelation and in the theological formulation of this dogma: the metaphor in which people are 
understood in terms of what we may know about God, and the metaphor in which God is 
understood in terms of human concepts. These metaphors can respectively be referred to as 
HUMAN-GOD and GOD-HUMAN. A root metaphor "serves as the basic assumption underlying the 
way in which we describe the entire enterprise of science or religion" (Mac Cornac 1976: xii- 
xiii). Root metaphors are hypothetical suggestions about the nature of the world (ibid.)! That 
is, on the one hand, there is a mapping from what we know about God onto certain aspects of 
inen (HUMAN-GOD). This metaphorical mapping' is prompted by Revelation, when we are told 
that man was made in the image of God himself. On the other hand, there is a more widespread 
mapping, GOD-HUMAN, which maps human-based conceptual categories onto categories in the 
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domain of the divine, as a way of partially understanding the latter; this metaphor is present in 
the very language of the Scripture, which uses human categories to convey what God has 
revealed about Himself, and obviously, too, in the corresponding theological language. Both root 
metaphors can be understood (i.e. each is a successful metaphor) because there seems to exist 
in many cultures a yet more abstract root metaphor whereby aspects of lower forms of being are 
understood in terms of aspects of higher forms of being, and vice versa. The overarching root 
metaphor in question is what Lakoff and Turner (1 989: 170-1 8 1) cal1 'THE GREAT CHAIN 
METAPHOR'. The two root metaphors that we have distinguished up ti11 now could also be 
regarded, therefore, as two different manifestations of this more abstract root metaphor6. 
These two root metaphors will be discussed again at the end of the essay, but it should 
be clear now that they are not mere variants of each other, since they map different semantic 
structures. Of the two, by far the one which plays the most relevant role in Scripture and 
theology, and which is manifested in a greater number of minor metaphors is GOD-HUMAN. but 
HUMAN-GOD guides in an essential way the insights gained from it, as will be demonstrated later. 
11.1 Submappings in GOD-HUMAN 
The manifestations of this root metaphor are a number of submappings. Al1 of these 
submappings are in themselves subordinate metaphors, and the term 'metaphor' will also be used 
for them. A hypothesis that, more or less explicitly, an important group of cognitive linguists 
sustain today, is that most, if not all, human abstract categories are at least in part understood 
metaphorically in terms of non-metaphorical, human-centred, spatial concepts like verticality, 
front-back orientation, source, path, goal, point, etc., or in terms of concepts which can 
themselves be shown to be ultimately comprehended, at least in part, as spatial configurations, 
like area, container, object, etc. (Lakoff 1990, 1993, Turner 1991, Johnson, 1987). For example, 
the notion of love is in part understood metaphorically in terms of spatial notions like that of 
container and substance, as in Iam full of love; see Kovecses 1990. And notions like those of the 
various types of interpersonal relationships, and most abstract notions, are also often understood 
metaphorically in spatial terms. Take as an example the notion of power, understood in terms 
of vertical spatial orientation: John haspower over al1 of us, He's at the top, etc.; or an abstract 
notion like that of event, especially action, which is often understood as spatial movement, as 
in John is on his way to success (see Lakoff 1990, 1993). Obviously, purely spatial interpersonal 
relationships do not tend to be constructed rnetaphorically: John is near Peter. The abstract 
notion of the human person is also normally understood metaphorically in terms of containers 
(see Kovecses 1990). However, other components of our notion of a human person, like 
experientially direct bodily concepts such as those of body parts are of course normally 
understood nonmetaphorically; but these are also often mapped onto God, as when we talk of 
God's hands or eyes, or heart. 
Most of the human categories identified in the present study as metaphorically mapped 
onto the domain of the divine are among those for whose ultimately spatial character those 
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linguists have provided abundant evidence. Therefore, the ultimately spatial character of so many 
of these categories cannot be in principle a distinctive classificatory criterion, since most of them 
display it to a greater or lesser degree: the source domains of the groups of metaphors established 
below are most of them in some degree spatially understood. Thus in principle most of these 
human source domains discovered in the submappings of GOD-HUMAN should be included in the 
space-based group of concepts by the classification in Table 1 below. However, the table creates 
a group for source concepts directly understood in spatial terms (verticality, container, etc.) 
which, as we shall see, are often mapped directly onto the domain of the divine. And it then 
creates three special groups: one for abstract notions, another for the human person, and another 
for human interpersonal relationships. 
The reason for setting aside these three special groups is that these groups of source 
concepts are particularly relevant in the constitution of the trinitarian dogma, as will become 
evident in the ensuing discussion. Interpersonal relationships are treated as a special group 
because of the large stock of source concepts they provide for the dogma, but they could also 
have been included in the group of concepts related to the human person. On the other hand, 
some of the categories that are not included in the group of source concepts pertaining to the 
human person could equally have been included in them, like action, which can be regarded as 
an aspect of people. And the abstract notion of personhood can also be assigned to the group of 
source abstract concepts, which includes action, existence, etc. 
Toble 1 :  Human conceptual source domains metaphorically mapped onto the domain of the divine 
Experientiol folk notions oftri-úimensionol space os 1 verticality, place, movement, container, boundary, 
source domoins 1 light, etc. 
Metophoricolly undrrstood obstroct norions os existence, being, essence or substance, time, events, 
source domoins action, causation, etc. 
Metophoricol ond non-nretophoricol notions of the 
human person os sourcr domoins 
11.2. Submappings in G O D - I I ~ I ~ ~ . ~ ' ~  with experiential models of spatial concepts as source domains 
1 present and briefly discuss below some examples where the source domain is a strictly spatial 
dornain, like those of tri-dimensional space and rnovement, or a domain, like physical entities 
and size, whose conceptualisation presupposes the spatial domain. 
personhood, emotions, bodily life, etc. 
Metophoricul ond non-nretophoricol notions of 
huinon interpersonol relotionships os source 
domoins 
11.2.1 Verticaliíj 
In the Nicene Creed (henceforth, N.C.) we read that Jesus "carne down from Heaven"', and in 
power, authority, status, family relationships 
(fatherlmother, son), love (as a relationship), 
language and communication, groups of individuals, 
social roles 
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the Gospels (e.g. Mk 16: 19) we know that he "was taken up into heaven". This concept is used 
to partially comprehend the notion of Heaven as 'God's place', and of God as 'being up'. There 
are a number of conventional metaphors in which the up pole of the verticality axis is mapped 
onto positive concepts like 'goodness', 'power', 'social status', 'intelligence', 'spirituality', etc., 
which help make this mapping to the divine comprehensible. 
11.2.2 Place 
In the same passages, Heaven is conceived of as a place in space ("ji~ornlup into Heaven"). But 
we know-from other biblical passages that Heaven is not necessarily tied up with spatial co- 
ordinates. 
11.2.3 Movernent in space 
The same passages, and many others, map the notion of movement in space, with the associated 
notions ofsource and destination, onto the divine: the Holy Spirit "proceeds from the Father and 
the Son" (N.C.), Jesus is "going to the Father" (Jn 14:28). He will "send" to the Apostles the 
Advocate "jrorn the Father, the Spirit of Truth who cornesfrorn the Father" (Jn 15: 26). 
11.2.4 Containers and boundaries 
The container image-schema (Johnson 1987) is fundamental in the concep-tualisation of the 
Holy Trinity, since, as we shall see later, the Holy Persons are conceived of as containers and 
so is the Trinity itself. But it is pervasive in the biblical and religious language about the divine, 
for example, when Heaven itself is viewed as a container ("into Heaven"). And allied to the 
notion of container is that of boundary, or limit, as when St Gregory of Nazianzus speaks of the 
"infinite co-naturality of three infinites" (C.C.: 61). The notion of infinitude is understood 
metaphorically as a lack of spatial boundaries, and this metaphorical notion is itself, within 
G U D - H U , ~ ~ ! ~ ;  mapped to God. 
11.2.5 Physical entities, size 
The concept of physical entity is an 'emergent concept', which has nonetheless a spatial 
configuration. This is why it has been included in this section. One of its subordinate categories, 
'person', will be commented upon later. An important spatial dimension of physical entities is 
size, which is mapped directly onto the notion of 'importance, status' and the latter onto the 
divine in Jn 14: 28, when Jesus says: "the Father is greater than me". 
11.2.6 Light 
This is another concept in this group. Light occurs in space and should thus be regarded as a 
spatial phenomenon. It is often treated metaphorically as a physical entity which can move or 
be transferred, or measured, as when we say: The light went out, or There is too rnuch light here. 
Light and dark can also be personified, and stand for Good and Evil. This ontological metaphor 
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makes it easy to understand the mapping onto Christ of a personified Light, like when He is 
treated as the Light in the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel, as in Jn, 1 : 9 ("The true light, which 
enlightens everyone, was coming into the world")*. 
11. 3. Submappings in COD-HUMAN with experiential models of abstract, non-emergent 
concepts, as source domains. 
This, admittedly heterogeneous, group of submappings includes human abstract notions. 
themselves metaphorically and metonymically understood, which are mapped, as source 
domains, onto the target domain of the divine. This is only a representative subset of al1 the 
abstract notions that are used to talk about God, assembled on the basis of their occurrence in 
scriptural and theological texts about the Holy Trinity. Given their large number, 1 will give a 
few examples of each and will only offer a brief cornment on the most relevant cases. 
113.1 Abstruct nofions in general (viewed as physicul entities ofsome kind) 
Abstract notions are commonly conceptualised as physical entities, and this is reflected in 
everyday language (Johnson 1987, Lakoff and Johnson, Knvecses 1990). Grace and truth, for 
example are conceptualised as physical entities of which the Father's only Son is "full" (Jn 1: 
14) and which we have al1 received "from his fullness" (Jn 1: 16)'. A special subtype of this 
ontological metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) is when it is at the same time a personification 
metaphor, for example, when we say that "1 was guided by love". This ability to personify 
abstract notions is carried over to the discussion of, for example, God's attributes: in the Old 
Testament (henceforth, O.T.) we find in later writings a consistent personification of God's 
wisdom, which is said to share God's throne, and be ornniscient (Cierard 1995: 1287). 
An abstract notion like that of love is used by St John to give us the most fundamental 
insight about God's nature: God is love (Jn 4: 8,16). 
11.3.2 Existente 
This notion is often metaphorically understood as a location in space (Lakoff 1990, 1993). 
Therefore, the existential interpretation of he in Jn 1 : 1 ("In the beginning was the Word, and the 
Word was with God ..."), or in the Council of Florence's formulation, "The Holy Spirit is 
etemally from Father and son ..." (Catechism of the Catholic Church, henceforth, C.C.), maps 
our metaphorically understood notion of existence onto the notion of God's existence. 
11 3.3 Being 
The same and other passages are more appropriately interpreted theologically as referring not 
only to existence but also, and more appropriately, to 'being' in the purely ontological sense. 
This ontological notion of being, which was borrowed into early Christian theology from 
conteinporary Greek philosophy (see Kelly, Ch. 1) is probably an abstraction metaphorically 
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derived from the notion of spatiotemporal existence, which constitutes its experiential grounding. 
This human philosophical notion is predicated of God. 
11.3.4 Essence and substance 
We saw above how truth and grace are conceptualised as physical substances. But there is an 
abstract sense of the term, denoting something like 'essential component'. This philosophical 
notion, which was incorporated into Christian theology from Greek philosophy, is probably a 
metaphorical projection from the experiential notion of a mass object. Lakoff and Johnson 
(1999) talk about the metaphor ESSENCE IS MATERIAL SUBSTANCE as underlying Aristotle's 
notion of essence. The metaphorical understanding of the notions is present in the Nicene Creed: 
"true God from true God, begotten, not made, ofone Being with the Father", where of; which 
has a partitive value, evokes the idea of a material component. It is also present in theological 
discussions of the trinitarian dogma that talk about the consubs~untiality of the three divine 
Persons (C.C. 57-59). 
11.3.5 Time 
Time is to a large extent conceived of as space (Lakoff 1990, 1993). This metaphorical notion 
oftime is projected onto the notion of time as applied to God. For instance, eternity is conceived 
of as 'boundless time': The N.C. says that Jesus is "eternally begotten of the Father" (C.C., 47). 
113.6 Events, action and causation 
Divine-related events, divine action, and divine causation, are understood in terms of human- 
related events, action and causation. And human-related events, action and causation are in large 
part understood metaphorically via a series of mappings from the spatial domains of movement 
and forces, which make up a coherent pattern called by Lakoff (1990,1993) the event structure 
metaphor. This metaphor conceptualises causes as forces, changes as movements, and actions 
as self-propelled movements. It is clearly at work in expressions like "through Him (Christ) al1 
things were made" (N.C.), or "[ ...] the blood of Christ, who, through the eterna1 Spirit, offered 
himself without blemish to God" (Hebrews 9: 14). They are consistent with this metaphorical 
understanding of action, in which means or instruments (even if they have a personal character) 
are metaphorically understood as paths to a purpose (which is regarded as a location). 
If divine action is understood via this metaphor, so is causation, but in a special elaboration 
of it: causation is progeneration (Turner 1987). This is obvious in biblical passages telling us that 
God is the father of al1 creatures, and it explains in part why a family role like that of father is 
mapped onto God. 
Causation is also frequently understood as a spatial source: "True Godfrom true God" and, 
"[...] the Holy Spirit [...], who proceedsfrom the father and the Son" (N.C.). Also when the 6th 
Council of Toledo (638 A.D.) declared that the Father is "the source and origin of the whole 
divinity" (C.C., page 58). 
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One of the special cases (what Lakoff 1993 calls 'a dual') of the event structure metaphor 
regards events and actions as physical entities which can be acquired (as in Igave my son a hug, 
or Take my word)lO. In any case, the 'objectification' of events and actions, and of many abstract 
notions, is a common metaphor in many languages Cjust consider eventive nouns like dance, 
destruction, orfall), which occurs independently from, but which is consistent with, the event 
structure metaphor. It is not uncommon for some of these objectified events to be personified 
(cf. expressions like 1 saw the face of Death, or artistic conventions like that of representing 
victory as a woman). This tendency explains why God's word (his linguistic action) is often 
personified in the O.T., a personification which paves the way for the later understanding of the 
real personal character of the Word in the Holy Trinity (see Gerard: 1471), as revealed in the 
New Testament (henceforth N.T.). 
11.3 7 Life 
This is a concept that is partly understood by means of a number of metaphors, among them 
LIFE-JOURNEY (Lakoff and Turner 1989). The concept of 'living being' is an emergent concept, 
but the abstract notion of life is, at least in part, metaphorical. This human metaphorical notion 
of life is itself mapped onto the infinitely more mysterious notion of God's life, as in Jn 1 : 3-4: 
"What has come into being in him was life, and the life was the light of al1 people". A usual 
inetaphor for iife is LIFE-LIGHT. The preceding passage makes use of this metaphor to te11 us 
soinething about God's life (and about life in general). Our human concept of life is also mapped 
onto the new (spiritual) life received through Baptism: "Baptism gives us the grace of new birth 
in God the father" (1 Corinthians 12: 3). 
11.3.8 Grace 
The theological notion of grace derives from the human notion of grace as gratuitous help or 
favour, special benefit. This human notion is metaphorically understood as an object, usually a 
mass object, which can be given, as is shown by the preceding quotation. See the earlier note 
about Greg Johnson's study of grace. 
Similar remarks could be made about other metaphorically understood human abstract 
concepts which are ofien used to talk about God or some aspect of Him, like knowledge and 
understanding, mind. similarity, plans and purposes, etc. 
11.4. Submappings in GOD-HUMAN with experiential folk models of the human person as 
source domains: personhood, emotions, bodily life 
This is a special group of submappings which could in part have been included in the preceding 
group, since notions of personhood are abstract notions. Both folk and philosophical notions of 
personhood ultimately depend on some basic metaphors. The fundamental metaphor is 
PERSON-CONTAINER, whereby persons are understood as bare containers for their mental and 
O Servicio de Publicaciones. Universidad de Murcia. All rights reserved. IJES, vol. 3 ( l ) ,  2003, pp. 1-27 
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understanding of the divine Persons. There are numerous examples of this. St John, referring to 
Jesus. says: "From his fullness we have al1 received, grace upon grace" (Jn 1: 16). He later 
reports Jesus as saying : "The words that 1 say to you 1 do not speak on my own; but the Father 
who dwells in me does his works. Believe me that 1 am in the Father and the Father is in me" 
(Jn:14: 10-12). See also Jn:16. The C.C (p. 60) says: "We do not confess three Gods, but one 
God in three persons". So the divine 'substance' (as Christian theology has used this term since 
Patristic times) is al1 of it in three different metaphorical containers. 
The metaphor HEART-LOCUS OF EMOTIONS is cioseiy allied to PERSON-CONTAINER. When 
we say that someone is close to our heart, we are conceptualising emotions as being located in 
a container (which is also inside the person-container). E~iiotional categories are an important 
part of models of personhood. This metaphorical location of emotions is also used by St John: 
"It is God the only Son, who is close to the Father's heart, who has made him known" (Jn 1 : 18). 
Other non-physical attributes of personhood such as volition, or mental life are also 
frequently mapped onto God. But even bodily attributes of the person are mapped onto God, as 
when we are told that God's hand is in everything, or that He can see everything, etc. 
11.5. Submappings in GOD-HUMAN with experiential folk models of human interpersonal 
relationships (especially family relationships) as source domains 
11.5.1 Power, authoriíy an~I status 
These closely intertwined notions are often understood in terms of spatial metaphors, typically 
with verticality and size as source domains, and their metaphorical understanding is mapped onto 
the divine. When Jesus says "[ ...] the Father is greater than me [...l. 1 will no longer talk much 
with you, for the ruler of this world is coming. He has no power over me; but 1 do as the Father 
has commanded me" (Jn 14: 28-3 l),  the basically metaphorical concepts of power, status and 
authority, which can, of course, be expressed by means of synchronically non-metaphorical 
expressions like commandorpower, are mapped onto the realm of the divine. Notice that Christ, 
"true God from true God", "came down,from Heai~en", and the Father spoke jrom heai~en in 
Christ's baptism and transfiguration (Mt 3: 17; 17: 5). On the other hand, Christ, after his 
resurrection, is "seated at the right hand oj' the Father" (N.C.). This last quotation is a 
metaphorically and metonymically complex anthropomorphic image of power and status, which 
is mapped onto the divine". 
Human notions in the domain of power and status, like that of 'Lord', 'King', or 'Glory' 
are also very frequently mapped onto the divine, as is well known, both in Scripture and in 
theological writing. 
115.2. Family relutionships 
The human notion of family is projected onto the notion of the Holy Trinity. The human notion 
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of fatherhood is a source domain to gain some understanding about the nature of the First Person 
of the Holy Trinity, and about His relationship to the Second Person. The notion of sonship is 
a source domain to grasp an essential truth about the nature of the Second Person of the Holy 
Trinity and His relationship to the First Person. Part of what we know about human fatherhood 
and sonship can thus be analogically applied to God the Father and God the Son and to their 
relationship: progeneration of son by father, and sharing of son in father's nature (as when we 
say, "my father died, but he still lives in me"), mutual love, obedience of son to father, etc. There 
are multiple N.T. passages where this parent-son relationship is revealed. Some of the most 
significant of them are Jesus' Baptism ("A voice from heaven said, 'This is my Son. the 
Beloved. with whom 1 am well pleasedn'(Mt 3: 17)); His Transfiguration (Mt 17: 5); Peter's 
confession (Mt 16: 1 7); and Jesus' formal statement of His divine Sonship before the high priests 
(Lk 22: 70). 
The notion of fatherhood is also used to refer to the relationship between God and his other 
creatures. The metaphor highlights here the fact "that God is the first origin of everything and 
transcendent authority: and that he is at the same time goodness and loving care for al1 his 
children" (C.C., 57). 
The notion of motherhood can also be mapped onto God, as in 1s 66: 13 ("As a mother 
comforts her child. so 1 will comfort you"), to emphasise "God's immanence, the intimacy 
between Creator and creature" (C.C., 57). Some feminist theologies, like Sally McFague's 
(McFague 1986), have proposed to replace the G O D - F A T H E R ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ O ~  by the GOD-MOTHERone, 
as more appealing and beneficia1 to our modern world. But, despite the many advantages of her 
proposal. 1 believe there is no need to eliminate more traditional metaphorical models of God. 
It may simply be sufficient to emphasise the projection of maternal concepts onto God, and add 
them to our stock of theological metaphors. No single metaphor will ever account for God's 
incommensurability; it may even be dangerous to concentrate on a single image, or just a few 
of them (Van Noppen, 1996). But 1 agree with McFague on her claim that we constantly need 
to find new ways to conceptualise God in an ever changing society. 
The concepts of husband or bridegroom have also been applied to God by various O.T. 
texts (see C.C., 84, section 370). 
II.j .3 Hurnun love (as un inrerpersonul relutionship) 
We are here concerned with the mapping ofthe interpersonal aspect ofthe human notion of love, 
rather than of its intrapersonal, emotional aspect, onto the interaction among the divine persons 
and onto the interaction of God with His creatures. We are told in numerous biblical passages 
and by numerous ecclesiastical documents and writers that the Father and the Son love each 
other and the Holy Spirit. who equally loves them. and that God loves us and al1 His other 
creatures. We are also told that God i.s love in the first letter of St John (4: 8, 16). "By sending 
his only Son and the Spirit of Love in the fullness of time. God has revealed his innerrnost secret: 
God himself is an eterna1 exchange of love" (C.C.: 54). Our notion of God's love can only be 
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(poorly) comprehended in an analogical way from our experience of human love. And so the 
Bible gives numerous examples in which the Lord's love for Israel is compared to a father's love 
for his son, to the bridegroom's for his beloved, to a mother's for her children, to a husband's 
for his wife (C.C.: 53). 
11 5.4 Language and communication 
Whenever we are told that God 'in general' and any one of tlie Divine Persons spoke, we are 
assuming a human model of communication as a source domain mapped onto God. The N.C. 
says that the Holy Spirit "hath spoken through the Prophets", and Jesus said to the Apostles that 
the Spirit of truth "will not speak on his own, but will speak whatever he hears, and he will 
declare to you the things that are to come" (Jn 16: 13); the Father spoke during the Baptism of 
Christ and His Transfiguration, God spoke to Moses, God speaks to each of us ... 
Even when Christian theology tries to elucidate the real nature of God's communicative 
activity, it has to resort to human categories of communication like those of 'word' and 
'utterance', as source domains used to talk about the transcendental Word and Utterance: 
"Through al1 the words of Sacred Scripture, God speaks only one single Word, his one Utterance 
in which he expresses himself completely" (C.C., p. 29). 
115.6 Groups of individuals 
Groups of people, like groups of entities in general, are often metaphorically conceptualised as 
containers. This partly metaphorical human notion of groups of people is transferred to the Holy 
Trinity, who is also regarded as a container: "O my God. Trinity whom 1 adore, help me forget 
myself entirely so as to establish myself in you" (Prayer of Blessed Elizabeth of the Trinity. 
C.C.: 62). 
115.7 Social roles 
We have already commented above how God, especially the Father and Jesus Christ, is 
understood as King, andas Lord, entitled to receive glory. But other humanly created social roles 
are mapped onto some of the divine Persons. The Holy Spirit is ofien called 'Paraclete', a Greek 
term which was translated into Latin as 'Advocate' ('Ad-vocatus'), that is, the one whom one 
calls to one's side. This expression has normally been (metonymically) translated into modem 
languages as 'Consoler' (C.C.: 160). Christ and the Holy Spirit are often called 'Teachers': in 
Catechesis it is Christ that teaches through the lips of the Catechist (C.C.: 95). And it is the Holy 
Spirit that teaches us to pray (C.C.: 564). The Holy Spirit is the "principal author" of Holy 
Scripture (C.C.: 72). He is also an envoy, as we know when Jesus Christ promises to send him. 
11.6. Submappings used to illustrate the dogma 
Of the submappings in the root metaphor under study, some of the most relevant ones in the 
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structure of the dogma are the personification of God's linguistic action as His Word, the 
personification of Christ as the Light, the mapping of the parent-child relationship onto God, and 
the mapping onto Him of the notion of spatial movement. These submetaphors have been used 
to illustrate the dogma, especially at the time when it was being formed (see Kelly 1968: 
chapters 4. 5, 9 and 10). 
The following section is an attempt at showing how some of these submetaphors can be 
used to illustrate the mysterious coherence of the dogma. 
111. METAPHORICO-METONYMIC COHERENCE IN THE DOGMA 
The preceding survey of human source domains and divine target domains contains just a small 
subset of the many submappings in GOD-HUMAN that underlie some of the key biblical passages 
where the trinitarian mystery is revealed, and the formulation and discussion of the dogma. The 
purpose of the survey was to show the enormous richness of this root metaphor, but no attempt 
was made to discuss the way in which these submappings can be used to illustrate at a purely 
figurative leve1 our (very limited) understanding of the mystery of the Holy Trinity. This is the 
purpose of the following section. Of course, the mystery is and will always remain a mystery, 
but revelation and theological reflection over it have at least given it some degree of figurative 
coherence, which has been arrived at on the basis of those submappings, and which might 
constitute a figurative illustration of the mysterious coherence of this dogma, the mystery of 
God's pluralistic simplicity. In any case, it should be stressed that what is presented below are 
just anuinber of suggestions to illustrate analogically, in an imaginative way, the Christian belief 
that though apparently contradictory, the propositions in the dogma have to be compatible, 
because they are based on what God revealed to us about Himself. However, the proposals below 
are based on some of the theographic metaphors studied so far, which are themselves just mere 
imaginative attempts at coming to terms with a Reality that ultimately surpasses us. Therefore 
they do not constitute an explanation of the dogma, which would certainly be a pointless task. 
They are just some of the possible ways of exploiting some of the most frequently used 
submetaphors in the formulation of the dogma, namely, those listed in 11.6 above. As we shall 
see presently, the apparent figurative coherence of these various submappings with the dogma 
and with each other, can be achieved principally by proposing a series of metonymies (111.1 
below). The attempts at illustrating the dogma by means of these metaphors without recourse to 
the metonymies are shown in 111.2. to be less fruitful. 
111. 1. Metonymies 
In my view, the submetaphors in 11.6 can be made more coherent with the dogma and with each 
other by applying to them several specific instantiations of the part-for-part general metonymic 
type studied by Radden and Kovecses (in press). These linguists propose two general types of 
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conceptual relationships: a) the relationship between a whole ICM" or part of it; b) the 
relationship between two parts of an ICM. These relationships can give rise to three general 
types of metonymies: a part of an ICM for the whole of it, the whole of an ICM for a part of it, 
and a part of an ICM for another part of the same ICM. These general types of metonymies can 
be instantiated in severa1 specific subtypes. For instance, the part for whole type can be 
instantiated by metonymies where a part of a thing stands for the whole thing, by member-for- 
category metonymies, etc.; the whole for part type is instantiated by metonymies where the 
whole of a thing stands for a part of it, by metonymies where the whole event stands for a part 
of the event, etc.; the part for part type is instantiated by agent for action and by action for agent 
metonymies, by instrument for action metonymies, etc. Radden & Kovecses offer nurnerous 
examples of each kind. 
It is not easy to decide exactly which of the specific instantiations proposed by Radden and 
Kovecses the relationships below fit into, but to me it is obvious that these are cases that respond 
to their general metonymic relationship 'part-and-part' and to the general metonymic type 'part 
for part'. The metonymy-generating relationships in question are: 
The relationship between God and His word, his linguistic action. 
The relationship between a light and its radiance. 
The relationship between a parent and heríhis offspring. 
The relationship between the initial or the final point of a path and the mover along this 
path. 
Let us explicate our proposals. 
God utters His word and then His word can stand for Him. There exists a specific 
metonymic relationship between action and agent, whereby one can stand for the other. We are 
concerned here with the case in which the action (the word) would stand for the agent (God). We 
have numerous conventional examples in many languages of this specific action-for-agent 
metonymy. Just think of deverbal nouns denoting agents which have as their lexical morpheme 
a verb denoting an action: writer, speaker. We can also ofien use referring expressions where 
the agent is identified by his action: The mun thut helped you hus come (to refer to someone 
whose foremost characteristic in your personal experience of him was the help he provided to 
you). In an extreme figurative mapping, at once metaphorical and rnetonymic, we often simply 
nominalise the action, without any agentive inflectional rnorpherne. and use the nominalisation 
to refer to the agent typically characterised, in a given context where background knowledge is 
shared by speaker and listener, by that action: Your help come (rneaning, in a metonymic 
abbreviation, 'the person that helped you'). Note that the action refers to the whole of the agent, 
not just to an aspect of it, although the agent is experientially known and rnentally accessible 
only or principally frorn the perspective of his specific action. 
Sirnilarly, God's word can stand in our minds for the whole of God himself. This 
O Servicio de Publicaciones. Universidad de Murcia. Al1 rights reserved. IJES, vol. 3 ( 1  ). 2003, pp. 1-27 
The Melapliorical und Metonyniic Utiderstunding ufthe Triniturian Dogniu 15 
metonymic substitution of the action for the whole of the agent might provide a metonymic 
bridge between the oneness of God and the fact that both the First and the Second Person are 
wholly God. 
There is also a metonymic relationship between causes and effects. We are interested here 
in what in fact appears to be the more common metonymic kind arising in this relationship: 
effect for cause (see Radden and Kovecses, ihid). The relationship between a light-cause and the 
light that it brings about is an instance of the cause and effect relationship. The cases in which 
the light stands for its source is an instance of the effect for cause metonymic kind. Just think of 
the frequent use in English ofthe noun light to denote a match, which is a light-source, or when 
we ask a friend to bring some 'lights' (referring to some torches) to an evening party on the 
beach. or when we say Turn on/o# the light (what is actually turned on or off is the electric 
power which brings about light). Similarly, if God is the cause of al1 Light (He is Light himself) 
and gives off Light, His light can metonymically stand for the whole of God Himself. 
It is not clear in which type of metonymic relationship of those proposed by Radden and 
Kovecses the relationship between a parent and hislher offspring should be included. But the fact 
is that the offspring are often conceptualised from the perspective of their parents, typically from 
the perspective of their father, and especially by those that do not have yet any direct personal 
acquaintance with the children. The very conventions of naming normally use the father's name 
(the family name or last name) as the distinctive name for the children. We normally refer to 
someone whose name we do not know, or whose father is for some reason a particularly relevant 
piece of information to highlight, as the son o$.. And very often, too, we colloquially substitute 
the father (or the mother) fully for the child as a way of referring to the child. We may say Here 
conzes Archie to refer to Archie's son. even though he has a different forename. So it is with the 
Second Person. He came to be known as the Son of'God. The concept 'God' is a distinguishing 
attribute in the expression, and it overshadows the concept 'son'. Therefore the whole of God 
metonymically stands for 'Son of God', and the Son is thus called 'God'. 
There is finally a metonymic connection between the initial and the final point in a path 
and the mover along this path. Expressions like The London truin can refer to the train bound 
for or coming from London. We are concerned here with the metonymy in which the initial point 
in the path stands for the mover along the path. Among other cases of this metonymy we can cite 
the numerous exainples in which we foreground the origin of a mover, as when we say The 
student that catne,frorn Durhmn, to refer to a student whose name we do not know, but whose 
provenance we do know. An extreme case would be the colloquial cases in which a locative 
expression is used with personal reference, somewhat like a personal name: Reudirzg is sitting 
oivr there, referring to someone that comes from Reading. Similarly if the Holy Spirit proceeds 
from tlie Father and tlie Son, both of whom are God, He proceeds from God. And God, the initial 
point of His path can wholly stand metonymically for him. 
In fact, in the realm of the divine, these four metonymies could be regarded as special 
cases of the container-and-contained metonymic relationship, which, in Radden and Kovecses's 
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view, can also yield two types of part for part metonymies: contained for container (as in their 
example The milk ripped over for the 'The milk container tipped over'), or container for 
contained (as in John ate rhe whole box (of chocolates)). As we have seen, the metaphorical 
conception of people as containers is also mapped onto the Divine Persons. The Father is 
regarded as a container for His Word, His Light, His Son, and His Spirit. The Word and the 
Light that, being contained in the Father, come out of Him, can stand for Him. The Father is 
God. So His Word and His Light can stand for God; that is, God, the Container, can be mentally 
accessed and identified via His Word and His Light, the Contained. In fact, the Word and the 
Light become in this way a name for the whole of God, just as your help became a name for 
someone characterised by helping you, or just as lighr (radiance) becomes a name for a light- 
source. These metonymies become so entrenched that they create a conceptual network in which 
Word or Lighr can be identified as, in fact equated with, God: the whole of God is His Word and 
the whole of God is His Light. And yet, if we move out of the metonymy, the Father is still 
different from His Word and His Light, much as the speaker is different from his word ora light- 
cause from its radiance. This is what Sabellianism, an early heresy in the history of the Church, 
failed to realise (Kelly 1968: 123), when, in an attempt to preserve the oneness of God against 
possible polytheistic deviations, it asserted that it had been the Father that had become incamate 
as Christ, and had died and resurrected. 
The Word for God and the Light for God metonymies can thus also be regarded as 
contained-for-container metonymies. The other two metonymies proposed above can be regarded 
as instances of the container-for-contained metonymic pattem. The Father-Container can stand 
for His Son-Content. The Father is God. Therefore the Son-Content can be mentally accessed 
and identified via His Father-Container, who is the one God, and can thus be called, not Father, 
but the Father's name, which is that of 'the one God'. And as before, the metonymy creates a 
conceptual network that leads to the identification of Son and God: The Son is the whole of God. 
However, outside the metonymy, the Father is still different from the Son. 
Finally it is quite frequent for a container to be the initial point of the path followed by a 
mover. In the case of the Second Person this initial point is the Father. In the case of the Holy 
Spirit, there are two initial points, because He proceeds from the Father and the Son, both of 
whom are one God, as we know from the preceding metonymies. Therefore the Initial Point- 
Containers, each of whom is the whole of God, can stand for the mover. The mover, the Holy 
Spirit, can be mentally accessed and identified via these initial points, and can thus be called, not 
the Father or the Son, but their name, which is 'the whole of God'. Again, the metonymy creates 
a conceptual world that leads to the equation between origin (God) and mover (the Spirit), just 
as Reading could be identified with someone from Reading. The Holy Spirit is the whole of God. 
But again, if the metonymy is not activated, the Holy Spirit remains clearly differentiated from 
both the Father and the Son. 
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111.2. Metaphorical coherence 
The submappings selected in 1.6 can also be given some strictly metaphorical coherence with 
each other without necessarily taking recourse to the above metonymies by noting that the notion 
of container is claimed to operate in al1 of them. But the coherence of each of them with the 
dogma is less convincing without the metonymies. 
The PERSON-CONTAINER metaphor is closely allied to aset of other metaphors that are aiso 
applied to the divine. Each of the Divine Persons is conceived of as a container, and God 
himself, the Divine Being, is also conceived of as a container. We gave earlier, when dealing 
with the mapping onto the divine of the human notion of person, some examples of the 
conceptualisation of the Father and the Second Person as containers. The following passage is 
an example ofthe same mapping onto the Holy Spirit (Jn 3: 6): "What is born of the flesh is flesh 
and what is born of Spirit is spirit". The Father has Grace, Truth and Life (which, as we saw 
above, are metaphorically physical substances) 'inside' Him, and offers them to us in Jesus. 
After Jesus' Rising they are given to us by the Holy Spirit, who, being wholly God, as we know 
from the metonymies, and consubstantial with the Father and the Son, also has grace, truth and 
life in Him. 
The notions of uttering speech, of giving off light, of progeneration, of emotions (in this 
case, love), of moral attributes (grace, truth and 'true' life in this case), and of spatial origin are 
al1 closely connected. as we can see, to that of container. This is so because the utterer, the 
parent, the experiencer of an emotion or the bearer of an attribute, can be regarded as a container, 
with words, offspring, emotions and attributes as the content coming out of it. And the beginning 
of a path may be precisely the container from which the mover comes out. Thus these 
metaphorical conceptualisations, which, as we saw in section 11, are frequently mapped onto 
God, are al1 consistent with the conceptualisation of the person as a container. 
The sharing of the container image-schema (see Johnson 1987) by most of these concepts 
is one of the facts that might explain why Christian theology has been able to identi@ the Word 
with the Son and the Light (that comes from the Light-Source) as names for the Second Person, 
Jesus Christ, and why it has been able to recognise the role of the Father as the origin of the 
Trinity and of the Godhead. 
In the case of linguistic action, the words are distinct from the utterer, and via conventional 
metaphor, they can be conceptualised as physical entities, even personified. This capacity for 
personieing actions and events allows us to understand the fact that the Word of God can be a 
Person. At the same time, thanks to the metonymic relationship between word and utterer 
discussed above, the Word can cometo be conceptualised as wholly God, and the metaphysical 
substance that 'fills' the Word as a Person is the whole divine substance. The Word is thus a 
Person, distinct from the Father, and at the same time, wholly God, with the whole of the 
Godhead in Him. And since we know from Scripture that God is eternal, the Word is likewise 
eternal. 
The N.C. says that Jesus Christ is "Light from Light". This noun phrase (itself based, 
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among other sources, on the use of the term Light in the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel) has to 
be metaphorically grasped. The Light-Source is metaphorically understood as a container andtor 
as the point of origin of apath traversed by the Light-Radiance. This metaphorical understanding 
has always been exploited since the earliest times in Christian Theology (see Kelly 1968: Ch 3) 
to illustrate figuratively how the Second Person can be different from the First, and at the same 
time be exactly like it, that is, have the same divine substance. The radiance is different from the 
light, so the theological argument goes, but at the same time it is no less light than the light- 
source; similar arguments were derived from other images, like the one that contrasted the source 
and the river (both of which were fully water). 
The N.C. says that our Lord Jesus Christ is "etemally begotten of the Father", but that He 
is "begotten, not made, of one Being with the Father". The notion of progeneration is perfectly 
consistent with that of container, as we said above, since, at least the mother is literally a 
container out of which the child comes into the world. Even fathers can be regarded 
metaphorically as containers "out of which" their offspring comes into the world, as when a 
father says that his child has been born qf him. In any case, our source domain knowledge of 
human progeneration includes the specification that aparent hands down to his child his genetic 
heritage, so that it may be said that both share some of their 'essential' characteristics. This 
transmission of physical features is metaphorically mapped onto the communication of 
metaphysical 'features' by the Father to his Son, which is known as the consubstantiality 
between Father and Son: both are equally and totally God. This consubstantiality is the same that 
we have metonymically deduced for the Word. This may be one of the reasons why we know 
that the Word is another name for the Son. 
But there is, among many others, one part of our knowledge of human progeneration that 
cannot be projected onto the divine generation of the Son. We find here a cancellation of the 
epistemic entailment of the parental metaphor, since begetting someone implies bringing that 
person into existence; however, we are told that the Son is also eternal. This part of the mapping 
is blocked by our knowledge of the relationship between these Persons. We know, from various 
biblical passages, especially from the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel, that the Son and the Word 
had always been and existed, that they are eternal, like the Father. We also know this as a 
metaphorical entailment of the mapping of the notion of light onto the eternal Light: if the Light- 
Source is eternal, then its radiance is eternal, because the radiance is simultaneous with the light. 
And in any case we would know it from the metonymic inferences discussed above that identify 
the Son and the Word as God Himself, with al1 His attributes, eternity arnong them. Therefore 
this is one of the many cases that might be cited in which our metaphorical account of the 
mystery is at odds with what we know through Revelation about the Divine Persons. In terms 
of the cognitive theory of metaphor, we would say that one of the submappings in the mapping 
from the source domain of parenthood onto the target domain of the Holy Trinity is blocked by 
what we know about the inherent structure of the target. This blockage is predicted by the 
Invariance Hypothesis (Lakoff 1990, 1993). An alternative figurative way to illustrate (but by 
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no means explain!) how the etemal Father is Father (thus origin) and how at the same time the 
Son is eterna], consists of reasoning from the father-for-son metonymy suggested earlier: if the 
Son is metonymically equated with God, then He must also have al1 of God's attributes, 
including eternity. 
The metaphorical understanding of the 'spiration', as some theological texts temed it, 
from the Father and the Son that generates the Holy Spirit depends on the mapping of the 
domains of persons. emotions and personal attributes onto the relationships among the Divine 
Persons. But these source domains are themselves metaphorical and are understood in terms of 
spatial inovement, containers, and physical entities. Our Christian theology tells us that the Holy 
Spirit "proceeds etemally from both [i.e. from Father and Son] as from one principie and through 
one spiration" (Council of Florence, as quoted in C.C., p. 58)". We are also told by the N.C. that 
the Holy Spirit "proceeds from the Father and the Son", and is the mutual love of the Father and 
the Son. These sentences express fundamental truths about a mysterious reality beyond our 
grasp. The only way in which we can gain some (poor) understanding of these truths is by using 
our ability for conceptual projection. Therefore we understand that the Father and the Son, 
thanks to their mutual love, cause the Holy Spirit to be etemally. But how do we actually 
understand this 'causing to be'? The metaphorical expression in the Council of Florence gives 
us a clue. We map the domains of containers and spatial movement onto human persons, 
emotions and attributes, and these onto the Divine Persons. People are metaphorical containers 
for their attributes and emotions; these attributes and emotions are substances that can remain 
in the person-containers or come out of them. 
In the mapping onto the Divine Persons of this metaphorical model of personhood, a 
further possible submapping from the logic of containers and substances is exploited. The 
substances in a container can be projected out of them and move towards the same point in space 
where they mix into a new substance. In the Council of Florence's formulation the source 
containers appear to be two people simultaneously exhaling a breath (spiration), these two 
breaths mixing together in space into a new breath. These source containers are mapped onto the 
Father and the Son, the source breaths onto their attributes and 'emotions' (Etemity, Love, 
Wisdom, Grace, i.e. their Divine Nature, which, as we know, is wholly in both Father and Son), 
and the resultant new breath onto the metaphysical substance of the Holy Spirit. Again, an 
important part of our knowledge of the source domain is prevented from mapping onto the Holy 
Trinity, since the breath exhaled by the two people would have to be exactly identical, and what 
is more, it would have to be the sume breath: the Holy Spirit is wholly consubstantial with Father 
and Son. Furthermore, the two breaths and their conjunction would have to be etemal. Perhaps 
a better illustration of the relationship between the first two Person-Containers and the Spirit 
might be the one suggested by the origin-for-mover metonymy proposed earlier. 
Al1 of the preceding suggestions have sought to make the submappings of GOD-HUMAN 
listed in 11.6 somewhat more compatible a t a  figurative leve1 with the propositions in the dogma, 
especially by means of the metonymies proposed. However, Gómez Caffarena (1966: 308) 
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makes another proposal. which does not require any additional metonymy. He draws on the 
submapping, already noted in section 11, of a personified notion of love ('Love') onto God. If 
God is Love, as St John says, then it seems 'reasonable' to think that He in His immense, eterna1 
Solitude is not entirely alone, but that He has a sort of intimate, interpersonal Life, where Love 
can operate. Then God has used our own family concepts of 'father', 'son' to reveal something 
of His intimate Life to us. This proposal, again, is not an explanation, and it is not intended as 
such, but it is really attractive for today's man: it brings God closer to us, helping us feel 
comfort, rather than awe in His presence. 
IV. CONCLUSION: FIGURATIVE VS. LOGICAL-REFERENTIAL COHERENCE AND 
THE HUMAN-GOD METAPHOR 
The language of faith draws on human experience. This is what we have seen so far in this essay. 
We have surveyed a representative subset of the human-sized concepts, many of them 
metaphorical, that are projected onto the realm of the divine in an effort to grasp some important 
truths about God, or a least their essential aspects. This grounding on human experience and 
human cognitive structures has also been the 'strategy' of Revelation since the earliest times, 
even if at the same time it made us conscious of the unbridgeable gap cognitively separating us 
from God. 
We have seen that the metonymies and metaphors that can principally, and only partially. 
illustrate the dogma of the Holy Trinity are relatively consistent with each other, and that they 
allow us to perform some inferences, especially metonymic inferences, that might reconcile, on 
a figurative plane, propositions that are incompatible on the logical-referential level. The 
remarkable thing about this figurative bridging of logical incompatibilities is that we carry it out 
every day, unconsciously, and effortlessly, given the pervasiveness of metaphorical and 
metonymic categorisation and reasoning, as Lakoff. Johnson, Kovecses and many other linguists 
have demonstrated. Science, on the other hand, also uses these imaginative resources to gain new 
insights for which it still lacks precise concepts and language, as Mac Cormac (1 976, 1985) aild 
Soskice (1 985)14 have shown. Therefore religious language is by no means alone in needing to 
use figurative language and in its frequent use of metaphorical and metonymic reasoning. 
But religious language, even more than ordinary or scientific language, is inherenrly 
metaphorical andlor metonymic, and it is normally doubly figurative. The reason for claiming 
that religious language is inherently metaphorical is that the mere fact of talking about God by 
using human language and categories, constitutes in itself a conceptual mapping of our cognitive 
structure onto the divine. We often express in our everyday life concepts that are comprehended 
nonmetaphorically, in their own terms. In Lakoff s or in Johnson's view, these are basic bodily- 
based preconceptual 'image-schemas' ('verticality', 'movement', 'part', 'whole', 'centre', 
'periphery', etc.), and other experientially 'emergent' ones; and we use them both in ordinary 
and in scientific or poetic language. But whenever we use even these nonmetaphorical concepts 
O Servicio de Publicaciones. Universidad de Murcia. All rights reserved. IJES. vol. 3 ( l ) ,  2003, pp. 1-27 
The Meluphorical und Metonymic Underslunding uf lhe Trinituriun Dogma 2 1 
to talk about God, we are carrying out a metaphorical mapping of a human cognitive domain 
onto God, the Wholly Other. We cannot comprehend God in His own terms, because He is not 
apprehensible by our mind; we can only know about Him what He has revealed, and elaborate 
on this Revelation. But our manner of accessing this knowledge is inevitably metaphorical andlor 
metonymic (Soskice 1985: 96), Le., by prqjecting our human categories onto Him. 
The reason for the statement that religious language is doubly metaphorical is that a large 
part of our concepts, even some fundamental ones like person, cause, or time (Lakoff 1990, 
1993) are themselves understood at least in part metaphorically or metonymically, so that when 
religious discourse (inevitably) maps human concepts onto the domain of the divine, it often 
maps onto it the mappings by means of which the human source concept is understood. Even 
when common human terms are used in Revelation in unprecedented senses (VanNoppen 1996), 
these new senses are grasped thanks to the mediation of established metaphorical 
correspondences, like the new sense in the N.T. of word (the Word), whose comprehension was 
doubtless facilitated. as we claimed earlier, by the human ability to personify actions. 
It is important to point out, however, that this does not mean that man is in any way a 
model for God. Quite the opposite. There are numerous aspects of human experience that simply 
are incompatible with what we know about God. For example, when we are told that God is 
'Father' we apply our human experience of fathers, but not al1 of it can be applied, because our 
experience of them "also tells us that human parents are fallible and can disfigure the face of 
fatherhood and motherhood" (C.C., 57). This part of the mapping would be blocked by the 
Invariance Constraint. It was claimed earlier that this constraint also accounted for the 
limitations of the fatherhood metaphor as an illustration of the relationship between the First and 
the Second Persons, in that 'begetting' could not presuppose 'bringing into existence' in the 
generation of the Son by the Father. 
The fact that we can only glimpse what God is by using imaginative cognitive mechanisms 
does not mean that either Revelation or Dogma are not true, or that they are only true in a 
fígurative sense. Anything we say about God is a mapping of our cognitive categories onto God, 
even if that statement is a dogmatic statement, or even if it is contained in Revelation, which has 
been cast in human concepts and language. However, for Christian believers, these statements, 
no matter their ultimate metaphoricity, are literally true. Our comprehension of those truths is 
largely metaphorical and metonymic, but the truths are such, independently from the way we can 
mentally access them. Of course, owing precisely to the ontological chasm separating us from 
God, our comprehension of those truths will always be inlperfect. 
There is an old discussion on the truth-value of metaphorical statements, a discussion 
which cannot simply be conducted in purely logical-positivist terms, as Soskice has stressed 
(Soskice 1985: Ch 6 and 7 and p. 148). Their truth-value may be assessed in a way relative to 
the specific context of utterance and the background knowledge and goals of speakers and 
listeners (Soskice 1985: 5ff, Mac Cormac 1976: vii, 48), not on objectivist terms (see Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980: 170-1 85). In any case, there are at least three warrants for the truth of statements 
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about God. 
The first of these is what 1 called earlier the HUMAN-GOD metaphor. This metaphor has a 
biblical basis. The Bible tells us that rnan was created in the image of God (Genesis, 1:27). In 
this metaphor. what is known about God, no matter how imperfectly, can be mapped onto man, 
except for what is not compatible with our experiential knowledge of men (for example, we are 
not purely spiritual, eternal, almighty, or free from sin). The metaphor predicts then that man's 
cognitive capacity, including our ability to find commonality in disparate concepts, that is, our 
metaphorical and metonymic ability, must reflect in a very limited way some aspect of God's 
nature. Therefore, metaphorically- or metonymically-based statements about God made in 
dogmatics or in theology on the basis ofRevelation, have inprinciple the potentiality to provide 
true insights about God's nature, even though these insights will at best be a mere glimpse of it. 
The HUMAN-GOD metaphor implies much more: if man is not a possible model for God, 
God is really a model for man. In a mysterious way, the model of notions like progeneration, 
family, love, life. light, etc. is ultimately the Father's parenthood, the community of Life in tlie 
Holy Trinity, Their Love, Their Life, Their Light. Thus, we can ~inderstand metaphorically 
(GOD-HUMAN) and very imperfectly what it is for the Father to eternally beget the Son, but we 
can be certain that this eternal divine progeneration is the origin and standard of human 
progeneration (C.C., 57). Therefore, there has to be some mysteriously profound truth to a 
statement that regards God as a father, as a mother, or as a loving husband. 
These images have a biblical basis. But we could suggest others that would also have the 
potential of providing true insights. We may want to conceptualise God as the deepest layer of 
our being, as in Robinson's farnous metaphor (Robinson 1963), and so doubtless say something 
potentially true about God. 
We have an ontological connection with God, which we can only account for in a 
figurative way, by saying that He is our model (a model whose features we can just perceive 
hazily) and we His image. That is why 1 speak of the HUMAN-GOD metaphor. As images, we can 
safely assume that our features somehow, though very imperfectly, correspond to those of our 
model, and in this way form in our mind a very imperfect, yet approximate, irnage of our model. 
This is why 1 speak of the HUMAN-GOD root metaphor as a warrant for the GOD-HUMAN root 
metaphor. 
The second warrant, the most important of the three for a believer, is the guidance of the 
Holy Spirit, who will guide the Church in its pursuit of truth and the statements about God's 
nature proposed by each believer. 
In principie the HUMAN-GOD metaphor and the inspiration of tlie Spirit are supposed to 
lend plausibility to statements about God. However, these statements. inevitably metaphorical, 
also have to be confronted with what is known about God through the rest of Revelation and 
dogmatics, and they have to be consistent with it and with the knowledge gained from other 
metaphors and metonymies firmly established in the theological teachings of the Church. This 
is the third warrant for the truth of a theological statement, which constitutes a filter against 
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erroneous theories that may seek to describe God in terms that contradict what God has actually 
revealed about Himself in Scripture or in dogmatics. An example was Arius' heresy, which 
misunderstood the traditional interpretation of the progeneration metaphor and sought to map 
the complete human notion of fatherhood onto the generation of the Son by the Father, with the 
result that he claimed that the Son had had a beginning and thus was not eternal, and ultimately 
not divine either (Kelly 1968: 227-23 1). 
Whenever a proposition is made about the Divine, a traditional theological attitude should 
also be observed. It is implicit in my claim that any theological proposition about God is always 
to some degree metaphorical because God's infiniteness cannot really be modelled by our mental 
categories and by our experience. This theological attitude is the apophatic stance. No matter 
how sophisticated a theological theory is, it will always fail to fully explain God, to really be 
able to say what God is. An important difference between scientific and theographic metaphors 
is, incidentally, that scientific metaphors can eventually be proved or disproved to provide real 
insights into the object of inquiry, whereas theographic metaphors always have to be formulated 
apophatically. Cognitive semantics, which has emphasised the metaphorical nature of a very 
large part of human conceptual networks, including scientific ones, provides a compatible 
linguistic methodology for apophatic theology (Boeve and Feyaerts 1996). 
NOTES 
' According to Gómez Caffarena ( 1  966: 307), medieval theologians, though fully conscious of the impossibility to 
explain the mystery in logical terms. tried nonetheless to show that the coexistence of the three Realities, or Persons, 
of God. in one inseparable Being was not completely contradictory, if they are regarded as three Relative Realities 
subsisting in the perfect unity of God's Absolute Reality, and following a certain order of 'procession', but not a 
temporal one. St Augustine's earlier treatise is closer to the New Testament, as it is based on St John's use of the 
terrn lVord (Logos, Verbunr) to refer to the Second Person, who has thus, as Augustine suggests, an intellectual 
origin in the Father, whereasSpirit (Pneunro, Spirifi~s) is often used in the New Testament in cormection with love. 
A unitary Reality can only be differentiated intemally on account of the two main spiritual activities, namely, 
understanding and loving. Thus the Son, according to Augustine, proceeds intellectually from the Father, and the 
Spirit proceeds from both Father and Son through love and intellect. Augustine's doctrine has been accepted by the 
Church, but not dogmatically. However, al1 of these speculations are bound to fail. and they are also metaphorical, 
because they map hurnan concepts like 'love', 'reality', etc. onto the divine. It may be more interesting, rather than 
trying toexplain the mystery, to bring it closer to us by exploiting the time-honoured metaphors that have been used 
to illustrate some of its aspects, or by suggesting new ones, provided they are not used to make claims incompatible 
with the Church's dogrnatic tradition. 
But the extent of this pervasiveness depends on the particular conception of metaphor one adheres to. In Lakoff 
and Johnson's view, and in the present writer's, even some cases of conventionalised metaphors would be regarded 
as metaphors, and not as literal language. For a discussion of this issue, see Mac Cormac 1985: 57-71, and Traugott 
1985: 17-57. 
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One may disagree, even as a Roman Catholic, with some of the positions defended by the Catechism on certain 
moral issues, but as far as the main dogmas of our faith are concerned, the Catechism simply repeats the traditional 
doctrine of the Church, which every Roman Catholic is supposed to share and accept freely. 
' Mac Cormac says that root metaphors lead to myths, but in my view they can be part of Revelation. Revealed truths 
may sometimes be mediated by myths (as in some Old Testament narratives), and certainly revealed in metaphorical 
language and cognitively accessed by means of metaphorical prqiection (see part 4 below). But the truths 
themselves, are by no means 'mythical', if by this term we rnean 'fictional'. 
' The fact that this projection frorn God is part of our faith does not rnake it any less a metaphor, since by means of 
it a domain is partially understood in terms of another domain. We will discuss at the end of the essay the subject 
of the truth of these rnappings. 
THE CKEA.I.CHAIN MELAPHOK, as proposed by Lakoff and Turner (chapter 4) basically consists in a very abstract 
metaphor, the GENEKlC 1s SPECIFIC metaphor, whose mappings are guided or rnotivated by two entrenched cultural 
rnodels, nameiy, 'l'HE BASlC CHAIN OP BElNG and '(HE NAI UKE OF 'IHINGS (which are thernselves cornbined into 'the 
Extended Great Chain'), and by the pragrnatic maxirn of quantity. There is no space here for a detailed exposition 
of each of these ingredients, but'1.H~ CKEAl CHAIN M ~ . ~ ~ A ~ ~ O K e x p i a i n s  a arge nurnber of rnappings in which lower 
order forms of being and their attributes can be rnapped to higher forms of being and their attributes, and viceversa: 
people as animals, animals as people, things as people, natural phenornena as anirnals; it also explains the mappings 
that cannot occur. 
' The English version of the Nicene Creed is the one reproduced in the Catechisrn of the Catholic Church, p. 47-48. 
1 owe lo one of my anonymous reviewers aplausible source for this use oflight by St John: LICH.I.~S a conventional 
metaphor for IHE GWD. This property (and thus its rnetaphoric counterpart ~ici-ii) metonyrnically stands for the 
person that carries the property: ~ O D ~ E S U S .  in my view, perhaps even the GWD AS L I G H L  metaphor is 
rnetonyrnically based. since there is a conventional association between light and positive evaluation in rnost 
cultures. 
" Greg Johnson's contribution to the L.A.U.D. Syrnposiurn on rnetaphor and religion (Johnson, Greg 1996), 
elucidates the Christian concept of grace as the giít of God's presence. As a gift, grace is then metaphorically 
conceptualised as a physical entity which can be given. G. Johnson presents grace as conceptualised via the 'moral 
accounting metaphor' studied by Mark Johnson (1993), which rnaps the exchange of goods onto moral interaction. 
G. Johnson's study thus lends support to my claim that grace is, like so rnany otherabstract notions, metaphorically 
understood as a physical entity. 
'O An anonyrnous reviewer of this essay suggested that it is more accurate to say that events and actions are often 
treated metaphorically in these expressions as the handlingofobjects, rather thanasobjects acquired. Unfortunately, 
sihe did not adduce any exarnples that justified that clairn. In any case. Lakoffs view seerns to be quite consistent 
with the oíten observed fact that action verbs are oíten replaced by periphrases consisting of verbs such ashuve, 
take, give, receive, and an eventive noun: huve u wulk, take u blow, etc., in English and other languages. 
" The experiential basis of this irnage is metonyrnic: people that regularly appear physically close to powerful people 
usually derive from them a rneasure of power and status; therefore, closeness to powerful people stands for power. 
On the other hand, the right hand has had since biblical times an association with positive evaluation; the basis for 
this syrnbolisrn is probably also metonyrnic, since the right hand is the more useful and thus valuable hand. On the 
basis of al1 of these rnetonyrnies, the rich gestalt irnage of being seated (by irnplication, on a throne or on a 
prorninent seat) at the right hand of a powerful person, becornes a conventional rnetaphor for the concepts of being 
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in favour with a powerful person and sharing in his power. 
'' ICM stands for 'Idealised Cognitive Model' in Lakoff s terminology (1987). We have lCMs for countless events: 
situations and abstract constructs: lCMs for travelling, for apologising. for emotions and categories, etc. 
"The statement that the Spirit proceeds from the FatherundiheSonCfilioque) did notappear in the Creed confessed 
in 381 at Constantinople. Itmeans that there isanontological, not temporal, 'order ofprocession' according to which 
the Father first communicates His substance with the Son, and then, the Spirit proceeds from both. I t  was 
dogmatically confessed by Pope St Leo I and gradually introduced into the N.C. by Latin liturgy between the 8th 
and the 1 1  th centuria. This is even today a point of disagreement with the Orthodox Churches, who claim, as the 
Eastern Christian tradition had always done, that the Holy Spirit comes from the Fatherrhrough the Son. As Gómez 
Caffarena states (1966: 307) thisdisagreement appears today asa terminological rather than as a serious theological 
dispute. perhaps owing to a different elaboration of the same metaphor. Both accounts should be regarded as 
complementary (C.C. 59). 
" I t  must be pointed out that neither Soskice nor Mac Cormac, nor Van Noppen, also quoted in this essay, subscribe 
to Lakoff and Johnson's theory of metaphor: however their accounts of scientific and religious metaphor are very 
illuminating. 
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